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THE STATUS OF THE "LAST CLEAR CHANCE
DOCTRINE" IN THE STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
A. L. HARDEE *
It would be a work of superogation to review in any de-
tail the "Last Clear Chance Doctrine." A most exhaustive and
analytical comment thereon, with reference to supporting
authorities, is found in the one hundred page annotation in
92 A. L. R commencing at page 47. See also 38 Am. Jur. Sec.
215, page 900, et seq.
While the doctrine is considered by some of the courts
as a separate doctrine, the writer of this article is of the opin-
ion that it more properly is to be considered a phase of the
doctrine of proximate cause, and, in that aspect, it may be
more logically explained and understood.
Negligence, to be contributory in the sense of the rule of
contributory negligence, must be a proximate cause of the in-
jury or damage. It is frequently said that the Doctrine of Last
Clear Chance presuppcses negligence on the part of the per-
son injured or killed, which, apart from the doctrine itself,
would constitute contributory negligence. The doctrine, viewed
as a phase of the principle of proximate cause, does not allow
recovery in spite of contributory negligence, but considers
the original negligence of the injured person in getting into
a perilous position, as merely a remote cause, or a condition
of the accident, thus isolating such negligence and rendering
it not a proximate cause in the legal sense.
As is commented upon in all of the treatises, the doctrine
is generally regarded as having had its original in the old
English case of Davies v. Morn, 1 but the text writers seem to
be correct in claiming that there is nothing in that case to
indicate that the judges who decided it felt that they were
putting into effect a new doctrine, not heretofore known to
the law. The comment on this case, pages 49-50 of the An-
* Member of South Carolina Bar, Firm of Willcox. Hardee, Houck and Palmer, Flor-
ence. S. C.
1. Davis v. Morn, 10 Miss. S. W. 548, 352 English Reprints 588, 17
Eng. Ru]. Cas. 190.
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notation in 92 A. L. R., leaves no room for doubt that the un-
derlying principle of the decision is that the defendant's neg-
ligence was the proximate cause, and the plaintiff's negligence
only a remote cause, of the damage resulting.
It is worthy of comment that while, in 38 Am. Jur. Sec.
215, it is said that the doctrine has received the approval
and support of the courts of nearly all American jurisdic-
tions, no South Carolina case is cited. It is further stated that
there are courts which reject the doctrine. Among the deci-
sions cited is our case of Spillers v. Griffin. I
Consideration of the Spillers case indicates that the state-
ment might unqualifiedly have been made that the doctrine
does not apply in South Carolina, for Mr. Justice Fraser,
speaking for the court in that case, said, without qualifica-
tion, that the charge of the presiding judge to the effect "that
even though the plaintiff was negligent, yet if the defendant's
servant saw the plaintiff in time to avoid the collision, the
plaintiff might well recover" was the Last Clear Chance Doc-
trine, and that it "is not the law in this state" for which
error there was a reversal.
The author of the annotation in 92 A. L. R. at page 54
undertakes to analyze what was held in Spillers v. Griffin, and
summarizes as follows:
"In this case, however, the plaintiff was guilty of active
negligence, amounting to recklessness, which in any event
would have prevented the application of the doctrine of
last clear chance; and, indeed, the court in the case ob-
served that if a plaintiff wilfully contributes as the prox-
imate cause to his own injury, he cannot recover even
though the defendant was wilful."
The principal South Carolina reference to Spillers v. Grif-
fin, so far as the writer finds, is in Blackwell v. Bank, 3 where
the court cites it with approval, and says it is definitely se-
tled that the Last Clear Chance Doctrine does not apply in
this state. It should be noted that in neither of these cases
is there any discussion on the point, nor any elaboration of
any kind.
Considerable interest was created recently when our Su-
preme Court, with Mr. Justice Fishburne as the author of
2. Spillers v. Griffin, 109 S. C. 78, 95 S. E. 133, L. R. A. 1918-D, 1193.
3. Blackwell v. Bank, 185 S. C. 427, 194 S. E. 399.
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the opinion, in Scott, Admx., v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc.,
filed June 10, 1948, in the course of the opinion quoted with
approval the Last Clear Chance Doctrine, as set forth in
2 Restatement of the Law of Torts, pp. 1257, 1258, Sec. 480,
and said, "This is a sound law", the approved quotation be-
ing as follows:
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigi-
lance could have observed the danger created by the de-
fendant's negligence in time to have avoided harm there-
from may recover if, but only if, the defendant (a) knew
of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realized or had reason
to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore
unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the harm,
and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then existing ability
to avoid harming the plaintiff."
The case of Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division.
4 is
cited as authority for the proposition that the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine is sound law in this state, and there will be
many who will agree that the Seay case substantially approves
the principles underlying the application of the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine. The real basis of that decision, however, is
found -in the approved quotation from 7 Enc. Law (2d Ed.)
pp. 383-385, quoted on page 174 of the decision, as follows:
i * * * when the negligence of the person inflicting
the injury is subsequent to and independent of the care-
lessness of the person injured, and ordinary cdre on the
part of the person inflicting the injury would have dis-
covered the carelessness of the person injured in time to
avoid its effect and prevent injuring him, there is no con-
tributory negligence, because the fault of the injured
party becomes remote in the chain of causation. In such a
case the want of ordinary care on the part of the injured
person is held not a judicial cause (i.e. a proximate
cause) of his injury, but only a condition of its occur-
rence. • * * "
Other South Carolina cases, antedating the Spillers case
4. Seay v. Southern Ry-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d)
1S8.
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where the doctrine was followed, although not so designated
or referred to, should be considered. 5. 6, 7. 8
The Scott case, "supra, is unique. The application of the
Last Clear Chance Doctrine therein is the reverse of its gen-
eral application in that plaintiff's intestate was regarded as
having had the last clear chance of avoiding the defendant's
negligence rather than the contrary where it is more fre-
quently applied. Defendant, Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., alleg-
edly unlawfully sold plaintiff's intestate barbiturate capsules
without a doctor's prescription; he became, as a result of tak-
ing the barbiturates so sold, habituated to the use of the drug,
in consequence of which he deteriorated mentally and phys-
ically, and, while under the influence of the drug, committed
suicide by hanging. The deceased began to buy the drug from
the defendant in the latter part of 1945, and committed sui-
cide November 2, 1946. The court calls attention to the fact
that the complaint does not allege that the deceased was in-
capable of consenting to any one or more of the sales of the
barbiturate, or that the defendant had or should have had
knowledge that he was incapable of consent or lacked volition
or was drugged when making the purchases. The conclusion
is held inescapable that the deceased was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence because he continued to make periodic pur-
chases knowing the nature of the drug and its effect upon him
long before he became an addict; that as such contributory
negligence appears* on the face of the complaint, the defense
by demurrer is then as perfect as the defense would be later
on the facts, showing in evidence the contributory negligence.
The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court on
this subject is found in the case of Bishop, Admx., v. A. C. L.,
et al., filed July 8, 1948, where the Supreme Court affirmed
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant because the only
reasonable inference from the testimony was that the plain-
tiff automobile driver, in a crossing accident with a train, was
guilty of gross contributory negligence as a proximate cause
thereof, and, in response to the contention that the negli-
5. Bodie v. Charleston, etc. & W. C. R. Co., 61 S. C. 468, 39 S. E. 715.
6. Fletcher v. South Carolina & G. E. R. Co., 57 S. C. 205, 35 S. E.
513.
7. Disher v. South Carolina and G. R. Co., 55 S. C. 187, 33 S. E. 172.
8. Sauls v. D. W. Alderman & Sons Co., 55 S. C. 395, 33 S. E. 467.
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gence of the deceased was remote in the chain of causation,
said:
" * * * It is true that the negligence of the deceased
would not bar recovery if those in charge of the train
discovered him in a position of obvious peril in time to
have prevented the accident by the exercise of reasonable
care to avoid injury to him. This humanitarian doctrine
was applied in Seay v. Southern Railway Co., 205 S. C.
162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133, where there was evidence show-
ing that as plaintiff's intestate was driving a truck down-
grade to a crossing, the brakes suddenly failed to work
100 yards from the crossing, whereupon the driver made
a frantic effort to stop but was unable to do so, and those
in charge of a backing train in the exercise of ordinary
care could have discovered his perilous position in time
to have avoided the accident. It has also been applied tb
cases where a person, due to his own negligence, is on the
track in a helpless condition at a place where the railroad
company is required to keep a reasonable lookout (Lep-
pard v. Southern Railway Co., et al., 174 S. C. 237, 177
S. E. 129), and where the presence of a child of tender
years on the track is due to the negligence or gross neg-
ligence of his mother or custodian (Nettles v. Southern
Railway Co., 211 S. C. 187, 44 S. E. (2d) 321.
While Spillers v. Griffin, supr, is not referred to or over-
ruled in any of the recent decisions mentioned, it seems that
the charge of the Trial Judge, which in that case was held
to be in error, might well be warranted by the principles laid
down in the more recent cases, especially the Leppard and
Seey cases. The writer understands the Last Clear Chance
Doctrine, in its broadest form, to mean that plaintiff may be
guilty of contributory negligence which is in law a proxi-
mate cause of the injury, but if the defendant, confronted
with such contributory negligence, has the opportunity, by
the observance of ordinary care, of recognizing the plaintiff's
danger and an opportunity to avoid doing him injury and
fails to use it, the defendant is nevertheless liable. It seems
to the writer that the same result is arrived at when the prin-
ciple is approved, as appears from the Seay case, supra, and
when the negligence of the person inflicting injury is subse-
quent to and independent of the carelessness of the person
5
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injured, and ordinary care on the part of the person inflicting
the injury would have discovered the carelessness of the per-
son injured in time to have avoided its effect and prevent
injuring him, the negligence of the injured person becomes
remote in the chain of causation and not a judicial cause (i. e.,
a proximate cause) of his injury.
It would, therefore, seem, for practical purposes, that the
Last Clear Chance Doctrine, or at least its equivalent, obtains
in this state, and that the statements to the contrary in the
Spillers and Blackwell cases may not safely be relied upon.
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